y2016m03b04
20160330143900
assa
nadine@assaf.org.za
assa
South African Journal of Science
S. Afr. J. Sci
0038-2353
1996-7489
03302016
Volume 112
Number 3/4
Trading on extinction: An open-access deterrence model for the South African abalone fishery
English
Douglas J.
Crookes
Department of Economics, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
Abstract
South African rhinoceros (e.g. Diceros bicornis) and abalone (Haliotis midae) have in common that they both are harvested under open-access conditions, are high-value commodities and are traded illegally. The difference is that a legal market for abalone already exists. An open-access deterrence model was developed for South African abalone, using Table Mountain National Park as a case study. It was found that illegal poaching spiked following the closure of the recreational fishery. The resource custodian’s objective is to maximise returns from confiscations. This study showed that a legal trade results in a ‘trading on extinction’ resource trap, with a race for profits, an increase in the probability of detection after a poaching event and the depletion of populations. In contrast with HS Gordon’s seminal article (J Polit Econ 1954;62:124–142), profit maximisation does not automatically improve the sustainability of the resource. Under certain conditions (e.g. a legal trade with costly enforcement), profit maximisation may actually deplete abalone populations. The article also has implications for rhino populations, as a legal trade is currently proposed.
03302016
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/za/
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/za/
10.17159/sajs.2016/20150237
20160330143900
http://www.sajs.co.za/trading-extinction-open-access-deterrence-model-south-african-abalone-fishery/douglas-j-crookes